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THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION V. THE 
PROBLEM OF TORTURE 
Steven M. Kleinman, Colonel, USAFR∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is very little glamour attached to the work of 
interrogation.  The customers are many and often far afield, 
which makes it virtually impossible for any head of military 
intelligence to appreciate the full value that a Combined 
Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC) can give to 
the common effort.  A CSDIC transcends the sphere of purely 
military intelligence and becomes the handmaiden of all 
Departments and Sections, irrespective of service or politics.  
It may best be described as a universal agency from which 
intelligence can be obtained for the best benefit of the whole 
war machine, limited only in its capacity of output by the 
number of interrogators and staff available to the 
Organization.1   
While the act of torture might be reframed as “coercive means” or 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” and may be employed as part of a 
government-sanctioned program or only by the so-called “few bad 
apples,” the very concept remains an insidious problem that requires an 
understanding of its scope and a vision for its resolution.  For in a very 
real sense, this is a problem that transcends any single frame of 
reference.  Nonetheless, the many diverse yet interconnected issues that 
must be used to form a rational debate on this subject can essentially be 
divided into three discrete categories:  the legal, the moral, and the 
operational (or strategic).   
                                                 
∗ The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Central 
Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, or the U.S. Air Force.  Colonel Kleinman 
completed his undergraduate studies at the University of California, Davis, where he 
earned a bachelor of arts in psychology.  He subsequently earned a master of science in 
forensic sciences and a master of science in strategic intelligence at the National University, 
San Diego, California, and the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., 
respectively.  In addition, he has completed the Air Command and Staff College and the 
Air War College through the U.S. Air Force Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.  
This Article is dedicated to my late father, Colonel Ted Kleinman, U.S. Air Force, whose 
greatest gift was a legacy of courage and honor, and to my mother, Dorothea Kleinman, 
who taught me that the world's most valuable natural resource is compassion.   
1 As quoted in Kent Fedorowich, 14 Axis Prisoners of War as Sources for British Military 
Intelligence, 1939-1942, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 156 (Summer 1999).   
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Clearly, the substantive legal issues continue to be aggressively 
argued from both sides and need not be treated here in any depth.  In a 
similar vein, the recent charges of prisoner abuse have already elicited a 
reexamination of where the national moral compass lies relative to the 
treatment of prisoners.  Thus, this Article attempts to primarily address 
the operational considerations that have been largely ignored in public 
and professional debate, with the realization that operational interests 
can never be fully divorced from either the legal or moral elements.   
This assertion was dramatically illustrated when the world awoke to 
a global media awash with reports and graphic imagery of abuses 
occurring during the detention and questioning of suspected terrorists 
and insurgents at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.  In response to this 
media coverage, interrogation suddenly surfaced as a major topic of both 
professional and public debate and has retained its place in the spotlight 
ever since.  Previously lost in the shadows cast by other intelligence 
collection disciplines, this served as the impetus for a long overdue 
examination of the role of interrogation as a critical instrument in 
fighting the global war on terrorism (“GWOT”) and the 
counterinsurgency in Iraq.  Unfortunately, this important debate was 
quickly co-opted by politics and passion at the expense of expertise and 
experience.   
Setting forth the premise that interrogation operations are a 
necessary capability in modern intelligence collection, this Article seeks 
to accomplish two critical tasks.  First, it sets forth a brief yet practical 
assessment of the state of the art in strategic-level interrogation.  This 
assessment is done in large measure to remove the enduring shroud of 
misconception that continues to undermine a reasoned examination of 
the discipline’s role in contemporary warfare.  Second, it is not enough to 
simply bring the craft back from its submersion into the darkness; rather, 
a proactive and prescriptive approach to the way ahead is necessary and 
forms the basis for this Article’s second task.   
Clearly, strategic interrogation is a collection discipline that has 
reached a strategic inflection point in its evolution.  As a result, decision-
makers are presented with three distinct choices that will shape the 
future of the discipline.  First, they can take concrete steps to preclude 
future controversy by simply ending U.S. involvement in such a 
controversial and potentially problematic activity.  Unless a major 
investment is undertaken to develop a professional cadre of skilled 
operators guided by sound doctrine, this may prove to be the most 
prudent course of action.   
Second, activity in this sphere can be limited to tactical or combat 
interrogation.  The interrogation schools operated by the U.S. Army and 
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Marine Corps continue to produce interrogators who are highly skilled 
in the fundamentals of tactical field interrogations and who are able to 
effectively glean intelligence information from low-level sources in a 
time-compressed environment.  However, the nature of this type of 
training and the demographics of the personnel recruited into these 
programs have not—and will not—create the type of strategic-level 
capability required to systematically exploit the unique intelligence 
potential presented by “high-value targets.”  In the GWOT and 
counterinsurgency effort, the sophistication of the captured personnel 
and their knowledge of U.S. intelligence methods cannot be 
overestimated.2  Similarly, the complexity of the information sought 
through strategic interrogation (i.e., intelligence that will aid in 
understanding the adversary’s distinctive centers of gravity) ranges far 
afield from the type of concrete military information the disciplined 
tactical interrogator demands of the captured enemy infantryman.3   
Finally, the defense and intelligence communities can move to 
embrace the full potential of strategic interrogation through a major shift 
in mission, organization, and training commitments, which would far 
exceed the minimal resources and attention offered by the current 
paradigm.   
II.  INTERROGATION:  A BRIEF HISTORY 
It should not come as a surprise to learn that the interrogation of 
prisoners is one of the earliest forms of intelligence collection.  Examples 
abound, from antiquity to the present, of circumstances where 
information derived from interrogations played a key, even critical, role 
in the outcome of major battles.  In one of the earliest recorded instances 
of prisoner interrogation, the ancient Egyptian forces of Pharaoh Ramses 
II gathered invaluable information from captured Hittites during the 
battle of Kadesh.  In this instance, the Hittite king dispatched two 
Bedouins, who presented themselves as deserters, to spread 
disinformation among the advisors to Ramses II.  The operation was 
effectively neutralized when Egyptian forces interrogated two additional 
Hittite spies, who ultimately confided that the entire Hittite army waited 
in ambush beyond the city of Kadesh.  This vital information ultimately 
spared Ramses II what otherwise would have been an inevitable defeat.4   
                                                 
2 See generally GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S SECRET WAR:  INSIDE THE HIDDEN 
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES 1–2 (Doubleday 2004).   
3 See generally CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS:  INSIDE THE SECRET 
WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA 45 (Little, Brown and Company 2004).   
4 Paul Fein, We Have Ways . . . The Law and Morality of the Interrogation of Prisoners 
of War 70 (Nov. 30, 1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file 
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Interrogation also played a pivotal role in the ongoing expansion of 
an empire.  During the Second Punic War, Roman troops gained critical 
intelligence on planned Carthaginian military formations through the 
interrogation of captured military couriers.  This intelligence empowered 
the Roman commander, Claudius Nero, to launch a preemptive strike 
that sealed a decisive victory over the Carthaginian forces, thereby 
enabling Rome to continue in its quest for dominance over the western 
world.5   
Accordingly, a number of history’s leading military strategists have 
placed a premium on the value of interrogation to commanders.  
Antoine Henri Jomini, the distinguished nineteenth century Swiss 
general, detailed the value of interrogation in his seminal book, The Art of 
War.  Along with a system of espionage and reconnaissance, Jomini 
described interrogation as one of the most reliable sources of intelligence 
for an enemy.6  Military leaders in the American Civil War shared this 
view.  The value placed on interrogation was evidenced by the fact that 
the “thorough and coordinated” examination of captured prisoners was 
often conducted by very senior officers, including such notable figures as 
Generals McClellan, Meade, and Sheridan.7   
The intelligence potential of a systematic interrogation effort was 
also not lost on America’s adversaries in the twentieth century.  Dulag 
Luft, the Luftwaffe interrogation camp during World War II, proved to 
be an irreplaceable source of intelligence on Allied air operations.  
History has recorded the exceptional—and colorful—performance of 
Hanns Scharff, an interrogator at the camp who deftly obtained high-
value intelligence from Allied aircrews.  His accomplishments would be 
noteworthy if only for the incredible volume of intelligence he was able 
to gather.  Equally remarkable, however, were his methods.  Rather than 
compelling his prisoners to reveal classified data through the use of 
coercive means (as some of his colleagues were known to employ in 
ruthless fashion), his consistent success was the result of carefully 
orchestrated, essentially amicable exchanges with his prisoners.  
                                                                                                             
with the Army Intelligence School Library) (quoting FRANCIS DVORNIK, ORIGINS OF 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:  THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, PERSIA, GREECE, ROME, BYZANTIUM, THE 
ARAB MUSLIM EMPIRES, THE MONGOL EMPIRE, CHINA, MUSCOVY 12, 14 (Rutgers University 
Press 1974)).   
5 See DAVID KAHN, HITLER’S SPIES:  GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II 
27 (Da Capo Press 1978).   
6 See MICHAEL I. HANDEL, MASTERS OF WAR:  CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT 249 (Frank 
Cass 3d ed. 2001) (1992).   
7 Fein, supra note 4, at 73 (quoting PETER MASLOWSKI, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES 
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR:  A CASE STUDY, IN U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
HISTORY:  A SOURCEBOOK 30, 36 (James P. Finley ed., U.S. Army Intelligence Center and 
Fort Hauchuca 1995)).   
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Drawing upon his mastery of the complex art of interrogation, he offers 
this observation concerning the timeless value of the discipline as a form 
of intelligence collection:   
AS LONG AS WARS have been waged on this earth, 
captors have taken the right to question captives.  As 
long as POWs are interrogated, they will talk.  No 
patriotism, no self-control, no logic gives any man 
enough strength to repel relentlessly pressed attacks 
utilizing accumulated combinations of facts and 
circumstantial evidence.8   
The twentieth century witnessed a major transformation in the role 
of intelligence that reconfirmed the central role of interrogation 
operations.  In a unique retrospective on intelligence, David Kahn, a 
prodigious author on military intelligence, delineates intelligence into 
two primary categories:  physical intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived 
from things) and verbal intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived from 
words).  He cites aerial photographs and the bodies of fallen soldiers as 
examples of the former, while a report on enemy morale or a stolen 
document outlining adversary mobilization plans are examples of the 
latter.   
Kahn asserts that in the course of the first 4,000 years of warfare, 
physical intelligence provided the preponderance of intelligence for 
political and military leaders.  With the advent of World War I, however, 
conditions evolved whereby the collection of verbal intelligence—
specifically including the interrogation of prisoners—became the 
predominant mode.  This fundamental paradigm shift in the nature of 
intelligence collection was driven, in Kahn’s view, by a simple battlefield 
practicality:  “It gave enough commanders enough time in enough cases 
to win perceptible numbers of victories.”9 
As the last century unfolded, however, interrogation operations 
navigated a rocky course.  The increasing value placed on verbal 
intelligence vaulted interrogation to a new level, resulting in the 
development of vitally successful American, British, and German 
strategic interrogation programs during World War II that were 
supported—and valued—at the highest echelons of government.  In 
contrast, interrogation proved a far more modest success during the 
century’s limited wars.  In Vietnam and the first Gulf War, for example, 
                                                 
8 RAYMOND F. TOLIVER, THE INTERROGATOR:  THE STORY OF HANNS JOACHIM SCHARFF:  
MASTER INTERROGATOR OF THE LUFTWAFFE 119 (Aero Publishers 1978).  
9 KAHN, supra note 5, at 39–41.   
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interrogation became embroiled in controversy, specifically in the case of 
the Vietnam War (despite many instances of success based on 
enlightened cultural finesse) and was managed as largely an ad hoc 
affair in the case of the first Gulf War.   
There is no doubt that the role of British 
intelligence . . . during the Battle of Britain was a decisive one 
[and] there is equally little doubt that POW [prisoner-of-war] 
intelligence made a significant contribution to that decision.10 
III.  INTERROGATION OR TORTURE:  THE RAZOR’S EDGE 
Although a ubiquitous topic of discussion, the term interrogation can 
generate an array of emotionally charged images and continues to be a 
source of significant misunderstanding for both the intelligence 
professional and the layperson.  Physical coercion—from the subtle to 
the horrific—has all too often been portrayed in the media as a 
seemingly integral part of, perhaps even synonymous with, the 
interrogation process.  Unfortunately, the history of the discipline is 
filled with far too many instances where interrogation was simply a 
guise for torture, and such heinous behavior still remains a tool of 
intimidation under far too many political regimes.   
In the debate over the employment of coercive measures, proponents 
are quick to argue that the application of limited physical and/or 
psychological pressures does not necessarily meet the generally accepted 
definitions of torture.  And in theory, they may be correct.  The problem 
lies in the fact that interrogations are conducted in the theater of stark 
reality, not a virtual world of words.  The problematic scenario—and the 
challenges attendant to rendering a meaningful assessment of what 
clearly defines torture—introduced by the application of coercive means 
is eloquently captured by Mark Moyar in Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, a 
well-researched account of Operation Phoenix conducted during the 
Vietnam War:   
Some people define torture as the infliction of severe 
physical pain on a defenseless person. . . . I define 
torture as the infliction of any pain on a defenseless 
individual because deciding which activities inflict 
                                                 
10 Kevin Jones, From the Horse’s Mouth:  Luftwaffe POWs As Sources for Air Ministry 
Intelligence During the Battle of Britain, 15 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 61, 76 
(EBSCO Publishing 2000) (quotation marks omitted). 
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severe pain is an excessively complicated and imprecise 
business.11   
IV.  THE PROCESS IS DEFINED BY THE OBJECTIVES 
As noted previously, interrogation has been a multifaceted tool 
employed by one power against another for centuries.  Dr. Paul Fein, in 
his dissertation We Have Ways . . . .  The Law and Morality of the 
Interrogation of Prisoners of War, provides an insightful perspective that 
facilitates a better understanding of this phenomenon.  In this unique 
study, interrogation is divided into three general categories:  (1) 
interrogation to obtain military information; (2) interrogation in order to 
convert; and (3) interrogation in order to break the will.12   
Interrogation operations conducted by U.S. military forces and U.S. 
intelligence officers have almost exclusively fallen within Fein’s first 
category:  interrogation to obtain military information.13  In the complex, 
integrated modern battle space this would be properly expanded to also 
encompass, at a minimum, the pursuit of political, economic, and 
technical information.   
The second category, interrogation in order to convert, operates from 
a premise that the surrender or capture of enemy forces falls short of 
achieving overarching political-military goals.14  As described by Fein, 
“The prisoner of war was now expected to become one with, or at a 
minimum to side with, the capturing power.”15  Political indoctrination 
or reeducation plays a paramount role here and is accomplished through 
psychological and physical pressures supplemented by hours of 
compulsory rote memorization of political doctrine.  Fein credits the 
Chinese during the Korean War as the first nation to systematically 
employ interrogation for political purposes and vice intelligence 
gathering, describing the event as the “first war in history fought both for 
ideological purposes and by ideological means.”16   
Fein’s third category, interrogation in order to break the will, focuses 
on a single objective:  to compel the prisoner, through any means 
necessary, to perform an action he would not otherwise accomplish 
under his own volition.17  While intelligence may be obtained in the 
                                                 
11 MARK MOYAR, PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY:  THE CIA’S SECRET CAMPAIGN TO 
DESTROY THE VIET CONG 90 (Naval Institute Press 1997) (emphasis in original). 
12 See Fein, supra note 4, at 112–36.  
13  Id. at 112.   
14 Id. at 120.   
15 Id. at 121.   
16 Id. at 120 (emphasis in original).   
17 See Fein, supra note 4, at 129.   
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course of the interrogation, it is of secondary interest.  Instead, the 
common objective that drives this form of interrogation is the production 
of propaganda.  The often brutal treatment of captured U.S. military 
personnel held by North Vietnam during the Vietnam War provides a 
graphic example of interrogations of this nature.18   
During World War II, the last conflict fought on a truly global scale, 
interrogation was conducted by the intelligence services of all parties to 
the conflict.  There was, however, considerable disparity in the methods 
employed and objectives served.  While U.S. strategic interrogators, 
along with their British military intelligence counterparts, employed 
sophisticated techniques designed exclusively to gather critical 
intelligence data, other organizations operated with a considerably 
harsher and arguably inhumane agenda.   
The Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei—Germany’s internal security 
apparatus) provides one example of this malicious approach.  It 
routinely used interrogation not for the information gathering benefits 
but as a cruel and highly effective means of mass intimidation consistent 
with Fein’s third category of interrogation.  In his book Piercing the Reich, 
Joseph Persico provides a graphic characterization of the Gestapo’s 
methods.  The primary objective was intimidation in support of the 
greater goal of mass subjugation:   
Before an interrogation began, the suspect was routinely 
roughed up for the shock value.  The effect of this 
arbitrary viciousness was to daze, humiliate, and throw 
prisoners off balance at the outset in the contest of wills 
with their inquisitors. . . . Once begun, the process was 
nearly irreversible.  If the prisoner had nothing to say 
under mild torture, the screws were progressively 
tightened.  He might be dead or dying before his 
tormentors could bring themselves to accept that he did 
indeed know nothing.19   
When intimidation, not intelligence, is the objective, the use of 
coercive means in interrogation is unfortunately commonplace (and for 
that very specific purpose it is demonstrably effective).  In addition to 
the Gestapo, Stalin’s secret police apparatus were widely feared for just 
this reason.20  The criminal nature of such methods aside, the operational 
                                                 
18 Id. at 129–35.   
19 JOSEPH E. PERSICO, PIERCING THE REICH:  THE PENETRATION OF NAZI GERMANY BY 
AMERICAN SECRET AGENTS DURING WORLD WAR II 81 (The Viking Press 1979).   
20 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PLIGHT OF THE PRISONER OF WAR 47 (1955).  
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nuance that should not be lost here is this:  any truthful information 
obtained in the course of these interrogations was almost always corrupted by 
fabricated data, false admissions or identifications, and unfounded speculation, 
all introduced by the individual being interrogated in the vain hope of ending 
the torment. 
The world’s most sophisticated intelligence services quickly 
understood this important distinction.  Markus Wolf, the former head of 
the vaunted East German foreign intelligence service, acknowledged this 
fundamental principle when he observed that “interrogations . . . should 
serve to extract useful information from the prisoner . . . not to exact 
revenge by means of intimidation or torture.”21   
V.  THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION 
At its core, interrogation is an intensely focused interpersonal 
dynamic.  While concepts drawn from research in the behavioral 
sciences have helped shape new and innovative methods, the actual 
exploitation of a hostile source remains solidly based on the ability of 
one individual to systematically influence the decision-making cycle of 
another.  In essence, interrogation remains the same managed exchange 
of information it was when the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offered his 
timeless observations on the use of spies more than 2,500 years ago in his 
classic treatise, The Art of War:   
What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to 
strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach 
of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.  Now this 
foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot 
be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any 
deductive calculation.  Knowledge of the enemy's 
dispositions can only be obtained from other men.22   
The passage above reflects a unique aspect of interrogation that sets 
it apart from other means of intelligence collection:  its ability to gather 
intelligence through direct and ongoing contact with the enemy.  It does 
not involve the passive collection of signals or the remote sensing of 
images.  In the course of an interrogation, collectors and analysts are not 
left to question what was meant by a phrase plucked from the ether by 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) or the nature of the activities inside a 
                                                 
21 MARKUS WOLF & ANNE MCELVOY, MAN WITHOUT A FACE:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
COMMUNISM’S GREATEST SPYMASTER 261–62 (Crown 1997).   
22 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 77–78 (James Clavell ed., Delacorte Press 1983) (emphasis 
in original).   
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structure viewed through the lens of imagery intelligence (IMINT).  
These questions, and those that logically flow from the responses, can be 
addressed directly by a source—the enemy prisoner or detainee—who 
can, under the right circumstances, provide immediate answers.   
Thus, the primary objective of an interrogation is the collection of 
actionable intelligence.  This is reflected in modern U.S. doctrine that 
defines interrogation as:   
[T]he art of questioning and examining a source to 
obtain the maximum amount of useable information.  
The goal of any interrogation is to obtain useable and 
reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least 
amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements 
of any echelon of command. . . . Each interrogation has a 
definite purpose—to obtain information to satisfy the 
assigned requirement which contributes to the 
successful accomplishment of the supported unit's 
mission.23   
VI.  THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION 
In assessing both the promise of interrogation and the problem of 
torture, there are a number of useful insights that can be drawn from a 
look at how the craft has evolved over time.  Toward that end, a review 
of the strategies and objectives involved suggest a sluggish evolution 
marked by two generations separated by a transformation in 
perspective.   
Through most of recorded history, prevailing political powers 
employed “first generation” strategies that relied heavily on the 
employment of physical force.  In this era, the fundamental objective of 
terrorizing—and thereby controlling—target populations took 
precedence over the collection of information.  It is of vital importance to 
note that many of the methods and even some of the devices employed 
today emerged during what might accurately be labeled the dark ages of 
interrogation.  The waterboard, prolonged standing, forced nudity, sleep 
deprivation, and exposure to extremes in temperature were all the 
products of those seeking to terrorize rather than to obtain truthful 
information.  The fundamental outcome of brutal, first generation 
methods was to force an individual to recant a politically unpopular 
pronouncement or to cause an innocent individual to admit to fabricated 
                                                 
23 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52:  INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-0 
(1987). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/2
2009] Interrogation v. Torture 1587 
charges of wrongdoing.  In sum, this form of interrogation had 
everything to do with state security but absolutely nothing to do with 
intelligence.   
The “second generation” of interrogation began to appear over a 
number of decades during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  It did not begin to receive formal institutional recognition, 
however, until the closing years of World War I, when the British 
Director of Military Intelligence began to examine in earnest the need to 
obtain timely and reliable information from prisoners of war.  From that 
beginning, the strategic interrogation programs that would later be 
developed by the German, British, and American militaries during 
World War II established, in unprecedented fashion, the potential 
treasure trove of information that can be obtained from the systematic, 
outcome-oriented approach to interrogation that relied far more on 
finesse than on force.   
VII.  THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE 
As the impetus for following up on this promising beginning began 
to fade shortly after the conclusion of World War II, the experience of 
Americans held prisoner during the Cold War (especially during the 
Korean and Vietnam conflicts) and the Soviet show trials gave rise to a 
new emphasis on designing strategies for resisting coercive methods of 
interrogation.  As a result, the preponderance of United States 
Government sanctioned research relating to interrogation focused on 
deconstructing coercive methods with the objective of developing 
strategies that would protect American servicemen who faced the 
possibility of being held in foreign governmental detention and 
subjected to prolonged exploitation.  It was during the course of these 
studies that such concepts as stress positions, sensory deprivation, and 
dietary manipulation entered into the lexicon of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, but then only as an understanding of the threat posed by 
regimes that flagrantly ignored the rights of prisoners as set forth under 
the Geneva Conventions.   
During this same period, however, the study of non-coercive 
interrogation methods to support intelligence collection received only 
modest interest.  Interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures 
established in the Cold War era fell short in building upon the legacy of 
World War II strategic interrogation operations.  Instead, the 
contemporary interrogation doctrine and training curricula have been 
developed without the benefit of formal studies into the efficacy of 
current offensive interrogation methods.  In sum, a considerable portion 
of “what we know” about interrogation—including the numerous 
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approaches described in the Army Field Manual on interrogation, 
detecting of deception, and drawing objective meaning from observing 
nonverbal communication—has never been subjected to scientific 
scrutiny.  There is, in fact, considerable research literature to suggest that 
many of the current methods are either ineffective or 
counterproductive.24   
When the post-9/11 environment brought about a renewed interest 
in interrogation methods, existing methodologies and traditional 
standards of conduct were adulterated by principles of coercive 
interrogation drawn from the studies of Communist methodologies.  It 
must be repeatedly emphasized that these methodologies focused on 
compelling a prisoner to generate propaganda—false confessions, for 
example—for political purposes rather than accurate information to meet 
intelligence requirements.  As the wars of the new century continued, the 
employment of coercive methods by American interrogators appeared 
with alarming frequency.   
When interrogators—many of whom are very young, possess a 
limited education, and work with only a superficial familiarity of 
cultural realities—are pressed into service with training based on 
outmoded concepts that are largely at odds with the current behavioral 
science literature, the potential benefits of interrogation will never be 
realized.  Additionally, when these same young men and women are 
deployed around the world without the benefit of a comprehensive 
understanding of the art and science of interrogation and without the 
guiding hand of an inviolate standard of conduct and ethics, the problem 
of torture is unlikely to be resolved.   
VIII.  THE WAY AHEAD 
To borrow a catchphrase once learned from an Army Ranger, the 
only things standing between this nation and a transformation in its 
approach to interrogation and the treatment of detainees are air and 
opportunity.  Both the promise and the problem can be ably addressed 
through a transition to a “third generation” of interrogation, where 
strategies underlying the foundation of this new paradigm will be 
informed by the following considerations:   
• Methods will be consistent with long-standing U.S. legal and 
moral traditions.   
                                                 
24 The author of this Article has worked extensively with behavioral science researchers 
from academic and research institutions across the nation in the examination of current 
interrogation doctrine.  Works to be published in the coming year will provide a detailed 
analysis that supports this assertion. 
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• Formal research will, whenever possible, seek to demonstrate 
the efficacy of methods in an operational setting.   
• There will be an institutional recognition of interrogation’s 
complex challenges as on par with those of clandestine collection 
operations.   
• Standards of conduct and formal vetting programs will be 
introduced to limit recruitment to those individuals best suited 
for dealing with the complexities and ambiguities of 
interrogation.   
• The long-term examination of selected high-value sources will 
take place under exacting standards and subject to appropriate 
oversight.   
• Rigorous requirements for initial and ongoing training 
accompanied by an unambiguous standard of ethics and 
practices will introduce a new level of professionalism into the 
interrogation discipline.   
The challenges before the new Administration—and indeed before 
the country—while formidable, are not insurmountable.  That these 
challenges still remain before us is reflective not necessarily of their 
complexity, but rather of the prior absence of a systematic effort to 
address them.  In this regard, the words of Colin Powell, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, hold true:  
“There are no secrets to success.  It is the result of preparation, hard 
work, and learning from failure.”25  
                                                 
25  OREN HARARI, THE LEADERSHIP SECRETS OF COLIN POWELL 164 (McGraw-Hill 
Professional 2003).   
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